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Abstract
Knowledge-based societies rely to a large extent on intangible outputs and 
digital technologies, and these are having a growing influence on information 
systems, media, governance and citizenship. At the same time, the increasing role 
played by online platforms in manipulating transnational public debates, legitimis-
ing algorithmic non-transparent decision-making and inciting hate speech and 
violence through misinformation, disinformation and propaganda are warning 
signs of the negative repercussions such digital ecosystem can have on rule of law, 
political systems, free thought and critical awareness. There is a clear need for 
international regulation in this area. Rooted in an interdisciplinary approach, this 
chapter combines an examination of the theoretical, conceptual and methodologi-
cal frameworks with an analysis of various relevant public and private archives. The 
aim is threefold: to outline the issues and challenges in terms of human (and labour) 
rights, freedom and democracy; to identify the regulatory provisions adopted at 
European and international level to promote accountability, civil participation, and 
digital literacy; and to identify future prospects, risks and uncertainties in the era of 
artificial intelligence.
Keywords: Knowledge-based societies, Democracy, Human and labour rights, 
Citizenship, Critical awareness, Algorithmic ecosystems, Artificial Intelligence, 
Digital misinformation and disinformation, Education and Media literacy, European 
Union, Interdisciplinarity, Digital humanities
1. Introduction
The pattern of a knowledge-based society relies to a large extent on digital tech-
nologies and intangible outputs and generates considerable transnational financial 
flows and gains. These technologies also play a key role in providing free access to 
data and information, encouraging citizen participation in public decision-making, 
fostering transparency and scrutiny of government action and mobilising new 
players capable of identifying alternative means of civic and political participation 
worldwide.
At the same time, the increasing impact of online platforms in manipulating 
transnational public debates and the surge in extremist groups using the digital 
ecosystem to incite hatred, hostility and violence are warning signs that these 
modes of communication may be having an adverse effect on democracy and that 
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the boundary between fact and fiction is not as clear as we may like to think. The 
misleading stories about the EU in 2015 following Russia’s hybrid war campaign in 
Ukraine, the US presidential election campaign and the Brexit referendum in 2016, 
the theories about COVID-19 that have flooded the web since 2019, the terrorist 
attack against French teacher Samuel Paty on 16 October 2020 and the cyber-attack 
against Microsoft which seriously affected the European Banking Authority in 
March 2021 are just some examples that highlight these trends.
Considering that a significant proportion of the world’s citizens now use online 
media as their main source of information, the proliferation of disinformation and 
the related threat of radicalism and extremism have led to a growing awareness of 
these issues at international and European Union (EU) level. What can be done 
to tackle the situation? How should democratic states with new forms of private 
power intervene in an algorithmic society? Where should the line be drawn between 
freedom of expression and media pluralism on the one hand, and intrusion and cen-
sorship of dissenting opinions on the other? How should information be defended as 
a fundamental right? Is there a moral or ethical code when it comes to information? 
How can we create an environment that is conducive to inclusive, pluralistic public 
debate? How can we equip citizens to develop a critical approach and take informed 
decisions? How can we balance innovation with the need to ensure transparency and 
fairness? Could we be witnessing a situation in which algorithms are “dissolving” 
democracy?
Drawing on the archives of international and European multilateral organisations 
(UN/UNESCO, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the 
G7 and G20, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe and the EU Union) and several public and private stakeholders world-
wide (including the International Fact Checking Network, the Ethical Journalism 
Network, the Future Today Institute, the European Group on Ethics in Science 
and New Technologies and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media 
Services), as well as an interdisciplinary interpretation of the specialist literature 
(especially in the fields of history, political and legal science, sociology, econom-
ics and computer studies), this chapter sets out to answer the research questions 
enumerated above from a threefold perspective: a) by analysing the issues and chal-
lenges raised by the proliferation of fake news, social media and algorithms and their 
impact on human rights, freedom and democracy; b) by highlighting the regulatory 
provisions implemented in this area at European and international level and identi-
fying their strengths and weaknesses; and c) by identifying future prospects, risks 
and uncertainties.
2.  Freedom of information and freedom of expression: a conceptual and 
legal framework
Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, recognised by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1946 [1] and by the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, whose article 19 states that [“Everyone has the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers [2]”].
Freedom of expression is inseparable from the principle of freedom of 
information, as enshrined in many international legal instruments, including 
the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) (1945), which calls for the “promot[ion of] the free flow 
of ideas by word and image [3]” the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
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Rights (1966) [4] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966). [5] Regional regulatory frameworks recognising freedom of expres-
sion have also emerged, such as the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (1967) 
[6], the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) [7] and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1987). [8]
On the European continent, the Council of Europe (CoE), a multilateral inter-
governmental organisation founded in 1949 with the aim of “fostering and main-
taining a European state of mind [9]” was the forerunner in the defence of freedom 
of information and expression as an integral part of human rights. This principle 
was reflected in the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) [10] and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), set up in 1959, whose work helped 
harmonise national notions of such freedoms and gradually laid the foundations 
for a European case law and standard in this area. In 1954, the CoE also adopted a 
convention to promote a European consciousness and the free movement of ideas; 
later, in 1961, the European Social Charter guaranteed several rights for workers, 
including the fundamental right to information (about working conditions, social 
protection, etc.). [11]
With the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) [12] 
in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) [13] and Euratom in 1957, 
Europe as a supranational polity was initially based around a “de facto solidarity” (to 
borrow Jean Monnet’s expression) and interests related to economic integration; the 
question of human rights was not directly addressed. Nevertheless, the four funda-
mental freedoms of the internal market – where goods, people, services and capital 
are allowed to circulate freely – necessarily result in freedom of information. From 
1969 onwards, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC), based in 
Luxembourg, made a point of interpreting Community law in the light of both fun-
damental rights common to the Member States and international instruments such as 
those of the CoE, thereby forging a Community case law and clearly confirming that 
human rights come under the aegis of European law. After the fall of the Berlin Wall 
on 9 November 1989, the enlargement of the Community to include the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, together with growing Community intervention in 
areas requiring the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, encouraged the 
EU to adopt its own protective mechanisms. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty [14] con-
verted the obligation to respect the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, previously applied by the European 
Court of Justice, into a treaty obligation for the EU and for Member States by virtue 
of their membership. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) [15] stated that [“The Union 
is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States. [16]”] In 1999, the EU set out to draw up a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which was solemnly proclaimed on 7 December 2000 by Parliament, the 
Commission and the Council, then proclaimed again on 12 December 2007 after 
being amended. [17] Its preamble clearly states that [“the Union is founded on the 
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it 
is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual 
at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by 
creating an area of freedom, security and justice.”] Article 11 of the Charter, entitled 
“Freedom of expression and information”, stipulates that: [“1) Everyone has the 
right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public author-
ity and regardless of frontiers. 2) The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be 
respected. [18]” The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) [19] gave the Charter “the same legal 
value as the Treaties”, thereby making it binding for the Member States. [20]
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It is also worth noting that the Merger Treaty (1965) [21] gave the ECSC, 
the EEC and Euratom (the “European Communities”) shared institutions – the 
Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament and Court of Justice – 
which now had a duty to comply with transparency, accessibility and integrity, 
considered as “principles of good administration”. With the Declaration on 
the right of access to information annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU 
entrenched its policy of institutional transparency, affirming [“that transparency 
of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institu-
tions and the public’s confidence in the administration. The Conference accord-
ingly recommends that the Commission submit to the Council no later than 1993 a 
report on measures designed to improve public access to the information available 
to the institutions [22]”].
The principle of freedom of information, whose origins can be traced back to 
the 18th century is an integral characteristic of pluralist democratic societies. [23] 
It states that all information held by governments and their various institutions 
must be public and generally accessible, and may only be withheld for a “legitimate 
reason” such as respect for privacy or safety issues. Some restrictions are therefore 
admissible, as long as they are regulated and comply with international law.
In recent decades, the right to information has been increasingly recognised 
worldwide and implemented by means of specific legislative instruments. This 
trend has been driven in particular by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), which recently launched an “Open Government” initia-
tive with the aim of implementing legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks 
that encourage transparency, participation and access to information in member 
countries. [24] For the OECD, the right of access to information is both a driver for 
inclusive growth and a challenge for democracy and public governance, with the 
potential to promote interest in public policy issues and encourage citizens to get 
involved in decision-making in this area. [25] While only 13 countries had national 
laws on freedom of information in 1990, now some 127 countries have adopted laws 
on access to information. Recognising the importance of improving universal access 
to information and knowledge, the 2015 UNESCO General Conference, followed 
by the 2019 United Nations General Assembly, proclaimed an International Day 
for Universal Access to Information, held every year on 28 September, with the aim 
of strengthening open science, multilingualism, ICT and media and information 
literacy, and reaffirming press freedom.
As demonstrated above, freedom of information and the free circulation of ideas 
are inherent to respect for human rights and central to the notion of democracy. 
Exercising the right to access information has a twofold impact: it encourages all 
citizens – civil society as a whole – to get involved in the public sphere, to participate 
in decision-making on public policy, to scrutinise and evaluate the performances of 
institutions and leaders, the economic system and the use of public money (and to 
identify instances of corruption); and it also prompts public authorities to be more 
transparent and open in the exercise of public governance, more responsive to sig-
nals from citizens, more attentive to the needs and criticism of society and therefore 
more open to reform. One of the most effective ways of tackling poor governance 
is open, enlightened debate with civil society – hence the importance of easy access 
to comprehensive, wide-ranging and accurate information for all citizens. Freedom 
of information can also lead to increased accountability and efficacy in governance 
and can bolster public confidence.
The need to adopt legislation to ensure freedom of information represents a 
major challenge in democratic countries worldwide. At the same time, the mere exis-
tence of international and national legislative and regulatory frameworks guaran-
teeing freedom of information does not mean that these will necessarily be applied 
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automatically or permanently. The content and scope of laws in this area vary, and 
their application depends on several factors, including the wider constitutional 
framework, the level of dedicated funding and human resources, the dynamism of 
civil society, and the ability of citizens to make use of the law. Even if legal provi-
sions do exist, freedom of information may be hindered by complicated mechanisms 
to access information, inappropriate management and preservation of information 
(including archives), excessive bureaucracy and impenetrable systems. It is there-
fore vital that we move from a “culture of secrecy” to a “culture of transparency” in 
the public sector, and that efforts are made to raise awareness among civil society of 
the importance of more rigorous standards when it comes to information.
3. “Information, the key to democracy”
In the contemporary cross-disciplinary sense, the concept of democracy has 
several interdependent dimensions, three of which are seen as foundational: citizen-
ship, the representativeness of political leaders, and the limitation of state power by 
means of fundamental rights. [26, 27]
In this context, citizenship serves as a leaven for democracy, reflecting the desire 
of citizens (states, districts, communities, even the world – “global citizens [28]”) 
“to act responsibly in public life [29]” to exercise their right to contribute to the 
way in which society is managed, and also to share their stories, culture and general 
concerns. [30]
The exercise of citizenship implies first and foremost the existence of a “public 
space”, the structure of which may be considered from four angles: 1) a(n) (intan-
gible) political space where citizens discuss, debate, share their ideas and compare 
their arguments in order to try to reach a consensus on questions of general and/or 
overall interest [31]; 2) a social space, which gives rise to “ways of living together” 
and fosters a “recognition of the other [32]”; 3) an economic space, represented by 
“the market”, governed in principle by objective rules and mechanisms, but which 
may nevertheless be a sphere for collective action with a political objective [33]; 
4) a (tangible) physical space, which can be divided into different spatial levels, 
centered around multiple networks and where multiple “possible futures” can be 
discerned. [34]
Over the past three decades, the physical space has gradually become a space for 
citizenship and politics, insofar as social, political, protest and even revolutionary 
movements have emerged in the streets and taken over symbolic sites (squares, 
parks, gardens, etc.), with the aim not only of achieving physical visibility but 
also of expressing ideas, exchanging experiences, spreading messages and creat-
ing symbols. As well as serving as the agora, the public space has therefore also 
become a space of public opposition. [35] Examples of this phenomenon include 
the Tiananmen Square protests (Beijing, 1989), the University Square/“Golaniad” 
protests (Bucharest, 1990), the “Arab Spring” (a series of anti-government pro-
tests, uprisings and armed rebellions that spread across much of the Arab world 
in 2010–2011), “Occupy Wall Street” (New York, 2011), the Gezi Park protests 
(Istanbul, 2013), the Umbrella Movement (Hong Kong, 2014), the Maidan Square 
protests (Kiev, 2014), the “Nuit debout” movement (Paris, 2016) and the “Yellow 
Vest” movement (France, 2018–2019).
The notion of public space is inseparable from that of civil society, which 
provides a framework for regular citizen engagement with the aim of reaching 
collective decisions on matters of public interest. [36] Civil society plays a role in 
[“ensuring that all content and procedures related to public decision-making are 
accessible in the public space, and relaying to the political space any demands made 
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in the public space and the various social spheres. It helps to control and balance 
the action of instituted powers – not just the state but also economic powers and the 
religious sphere. In this respect, at least in an ideal world, it represents a key place 
for the promotion and defence of citizens’ civil, political and social rights. […] The 
workings of our democracies rely to a large extent on the distinction and comple-
mentarity between the public space, civil society and political institutions. [37]”].
More recently, civil society has become an integral part of the political decision-
making process, not only through elections – the expression of direct democracy 
–, but also through the possibility of being consulted and sharing views on public 
issues – the expression of collective democracy. But if citizens are to freely form an 
enlightened viewpoint and make a useful contribution to the democratic process, 
they need to have access to information – reliable, pluralistic, independent informa-
tion, drawn from diverse and varied sources and media, which they can absorb, 
analyse critically on the basis of their value systems, and incorporate into their 
own judgement. The quality and performance of democracy depends on it – as has 
become all too clear in the current era of “digital democracy” (Table 1).
Democracy of 
transparency
Democracy of debate Democracy of 
consultation




Citizens who discuss, share 
ideas and compare their 
views with those of others




levelled at current 
democracy
Lack of transparency 
in the workings of 
political institutions
No real right to 
information
Public space closed 
or hampered by 
intermediaries
Leaders who are cut off 
from citizens and have 
become autonomous
Prevailing 


















Advantages of the 
internet
Low cost of storage 
and distribution







geographical barriers and 
creates identity
Reduced cost of 
engagement
Quick, direct, more 
informal access to 
elected representatives
Less costly citizen 
consultations
Potential for 




the role of informing 
or educating
Alternative press




in an advisory role
Institutional channels 
for participation
Frequent problems Tendency for model 
to lapse into mere 




How to move from 
debates to action or 
decision-making





Source: Vedel, T. L’idée de démocratie électronique: Origines, visions, questions. In Perrineau P, editor. Le 
désenchantement démocratique. Editions de l’Aube : La Tour d’Aigues ; 2003 ; 243-246. Here p.251. Our translation.
Table 1. 
The key trends in electronic democracy [38].
7
Democracy, Freedom and Truth at a Time of Digital Disruption: An Equation with Three…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.97662
[“Politics takes precedence over economics; Parliament is sovereign. The fourth 
power already exists: it is the power of information [39]”].
In 2019, under the aegis of the UN, the International Partnership on 
Information and Democracy was set up to promote and implement democratic 
principles in the global information and communication space with the aim of 
guaranteeing free, pluralistic, “quality reporting despite the changes resulting from 
new digital communication forms [40]”.
3.1 Media – at the intersection of democratic culture and technological progress
The notions of information and communication are inseparable from that of 
media (the plural of medium), a term whose primary definition – means of com-
municating information – is surrounded by multiple additional facets relating to the 
techniques used to process that information, to content itself and the way in which 
it is organised, presented and formatted, and to the regulatory frameworks govern-
ing these processes.
Characterised by varying temporalities, materialities and scales and by specific 
theoretical and methodological approaches, the many aspects implicit in the notion 
of media have changed considerably over time, as revealed by the emerging field 
of media archaeology. [41] Following on from the written word (used in the print 
press and also in telegraphy – the transmission of written messages), audio (for 
telephony and then radio broadcasts) and images (for cinematography and then 
television), new processes based on information and communication technologies 
began to be developed, driven by the emergence (1969) and global spread of the 
Internet, the arrival of the World Wide Web in the mid-1980s and the advent of the 
information society, bringing about a paradigm shift. [42] Non-instant communica-
tion (of written, visual or audio material) was replaced by communication in real 
time. [43] As new innovations gathered pace, this paved the way for information 
itself to circulate ever more quickly via new platforms, transforming the use of 
content (in both technical and social terms) and the way in which information is 
perceived, assimilated and consumed by the public. At the same time, [“No medium 
has its meaning or existence alone, but only in constant interplay with other media. 
[…] Radio changed the form of the news story as much as it altered the film image in 
the talkies. TV caused drastic changes in radio programming, and in the form of the 
thing or documentary novel [44]”].
The notions mentioned above relate to social phenomena: “the media represent 
an organisational system that takes these notions (information and communica-
tion) and incorporates them into various spheres: economic (supporting busi-
nesses), technological (boosting the quality and quantity of dissemination) and 
symbolic (serving citizen democracy). [45]” The following points can therefore be 
observed: 1) Given that all members of civil society (citizens, politicians, business-
people, associations, etc.) interact with information, the media can only exist in the 
public space, where they target both individuals and the community, with an impact 
that is both global and local, general and specific. In the public space, information 
becomes a common good, a source of democracy. 2) Over time, information has 
become more than just a source of knowledge; it is a product in its own right, a com-
modity that is subject to economic logic and the rules of the market. For example, 
in the mid-19th century, the print press was able to prosper and become a “press for 
the masses” precisely for commercial reasons, by printing advertisements that cre-
ated a link between producers and consumers (at a time when the purchasing power 
of the working classes was on the rise. [46]) Readers were seen as both citizens and 
consumers. Even if the press was structured in such a way that there was a clear 
separation between owners and news writers – resulting in the emergence of the 
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profession of journalist –, this nevertheless raises questions as to the way in which 
the media address their readership. How do they reconcile a sound business model 
(based on profitability, capturing market share, etc.) with the principles of objec-
tivity, transparency and balance that are intrinsic to information? To what extent 
do commercial obligations and ideological, cultural and societal factors influence 
the media discourse and products available to the public? Is this discourse neutral or 
skewed by a biased perspective and a prevailing value judgement which are instilled 
in members of the public, thereby diverting them from their own reasoning and 
subjectivity?
When he wrote [“[...] for the eye sees not itself, but by reflection, by some other 
things [47]”] Shakespeare was making the point that we only perceive reality by the 
way in which it is represented. The media do not offer us a “mirror of the world” by 
means of a neutral transposition of a series of facts, but rather a “showcase of the 
world”, in other words a view determined by a specific selection of information that 
is prioritised and presented in a specific way. These processes [“are governed by the 
journalist’s habitus, as stimulated by changing circumstances: an event-driven view 
of reality, an individualistic view of the social sphere [...] and a relative allegiance 
to the ruling elites, with which many journalists are in contact, both because of the 
routines of their profession and because they belong to certain circles for decision-
making and discussion that shape current events and opinions. [...] Roughly speak-
ing, all we know of the world is what the media tell us [48]”].
3.2 Information and the need for truth
In a democracy, information is a common good, a resource belonging to the 
public space and to the realm of public debate, which must be based on a need for 
truth. But in the past twenty years, the informative role of the media has undergone 
a number of major shifts, which have had an impact on the very notions of truth and 
democracy.
The first shift is technological: digital technologies have prospered at a rate never 
before witnessed in the history of technology, bringing about changes in the pro-
duction, management, dissemination and consumption of information – in short, 
the way in which we relate to information – for society as a whole (information 
professionals, politicians and citizens.) [49] A second shift involves practices and 
uses, which have resulted in a new type of relationship between information/media 
and their audience. [“The rise of social networks and their effect on mediated 
communication in present societies, as well as mobile communication, artificial 
intelligence (AI), virtual reality, and transmedia strategies, have encouraged the 
search for experimental and innovative responses […] which encourages extensions 
of the person for services, personalisation of content, and [an] updated meaning of 
place and time. [50]”] A third shift has occurred in the realm of information itself, 
which has been democratised beyond censorship, is now shared instantly across 
borders [51] and has been radically liberalised, to such an extent that any individual, 
often anonymously, can produce and share information and opinions and can 
judge and take a stance on the basis of their own truths and values. Information 
now finds itself within a transitional ecosystem in which traditional and innova-
tive media coexist and old concepts are co-opted to deal with new challenges. As 
algorithms take centre stage – in the absence of any meaningful ethical framework 
[52] –, information has become horizontal and fragmented; we are faced with an 
information overload and are rapidly reaching saturation point. [“Allowing every 
opinion into the public sphere and giving it serious time and consideration, far from 
resulting in a process that is conducive to knowledge formation, destroys its very 
possibility. [53]”] At the same time, the instant nature of information, [“the religion 
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of scoops and real time, the imperatives of concision and sensation, are conducive 
to stereotyped reflection, clichés and spontaneous acceptance of conventional 
ideas [54]”].
The proliferation of sources and the phenomena of fake news, “alternative facts”, 
disinformation and misinformation are becoming increasingly prevalent in public 
discourse, eroding the credibility of information and giving rise to scepticism, 
relativism and even to a “pandemic of credulous thinking. [55]” Examples include 
the radioactive cloud from the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which was infamously 
said to have “stopped” at some European borders; the false evidence of weapons of 
mass destruction which served as a justification for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003; 
and more recently, in 2016, the pro-Brexit campaign and the US presidential elec-
tion campaign. Alongside the information crisis, we are also witnessing a crisis of 
truth, fuelled by the deeply anti-democratic idea that there is no “established truth” 
and that the source of information may have more value than the information itself. 
In the “post-truth era” [56] [“a large share of the populace is living in an epistemic 
space that has abandoned conventional criteria of evidence, internal consistency, 
and fact-seeking [57]”].
In its 2020 edition, the Reuters Institute Digital News Report– which examines 
long-term trends in media use worldwide and analyses the role of social media in 
the context of online news usage – highlights two main observations. [58] The first 
is that news consumption is changing – news sources on the internet are gaining in 
importance, especially social media, which plays a vital role among young people. 
The second is the rise of intermediaries – “brokers of information that position 
themselves between producers and consumers while altering the flow of informa-
tion. [59]” An in-depth look reveals that in 2020, in many European countries, 
the proportion of the population using social media as a news source ranged from 
about 30 to 60%, and thus algorithms are becoming the dominant news source. 
These algorithms filter, sort, personalise, recommend and classify news content by 
prioritising data and opinions that corroborate existing preferences, while at the 
same time excluding (filtering) other content classified as non-relevant for the user. 
[“Intermediaries act as ‘gatekeepers’ by means of these functions. […] This task 
was traditionally performed by professional mass media (newspapers, television, 
radio). In the digital media environment [it is] increasingly replaced by algorithmic 
curation [60, 61]”].
At the same time, traditional journalistic criteria (professional assessments, the 
market and the audience) [62] are gradually giving way to what might be referred 
to as “news values – such as controversy, conflict, negativity, proximity or elite 
people. [63]”] While traditional media outlets are aimed at society as a whole in 
a bid to give citizens access to reliable factual information that is cross-checked, 
impartial and relevant so that they can make well-considered decisions, algorithms 
target users/citizens individually. But relatively little is known as yet about the way 
in which algorithmic systems of intermediaries function – they are often referred 
to as “black boxes” –, and this makes it difficult to accurately assess their societal 
influence. [64]
Could we be witnessing a situation in which algorithms are “dissolving” 
democracy?
4. Europe and “algorithmic democracy”
In an increasingly globalised, competitive geopolitical context, in which innova-
tion is seen as a key driver for economic growth, Europe is keen to give its Single 
Market a strong digital dimension. [65]
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4.1 Completing the European single market: from digital to data
In building what it refers to as the Digital Single Market, the EU “has to get to 
grips with new principles and notions arising from globalisation – such as demate-
rialisation, deterritorialisation, cyberspace and e-governance – and find answers to 
new questions about the nature of work, national sovereignty and territoriality, as 
well as the exercise of power and of democracy. This raises unprecedented social, 
economic, fiscal, environmental and democratic challenges with the potential to 
cause societal upheaval [66]”.
Europe is facing considerable challenges. First and foremost, despite its size 
(513.5 million inhabitants, representing 6.9% of the world’s population), its level of 
development (21.8% of global GDP) and its technological ambitions (2.07% of the 
EU’s GDP in 2019), the EU still lags behind the US and China and is struggling to 
assert itself as a digital power. [67] It also has to grapple with the technological and 
economic heterogeneity and asymmetry of the Member States in their approach to 
the digital transition (in which Scandinavian countries and the UK, Germany and 
France are the leaders). And finally, multiple stakeholders acting on different levels 
across broad cross-cutting policy areas are generating “contradictions between 
techno-nationalism and techno-globalism [68]”.
At the same time, digital wealth creation is strongly concentrated in the United 
States and China, which together hold 75% of all patents related to blockchain 
technologies, 75% of the cloud computing market and 90% of the market capitali-
sation value of the world’s 70 largest digital platforms. [69] The US holds a growing 
place in the daily lives of Europeans through the pervasiveness of web giants such 
as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft (“GAFAM”), and this has 
increased yet further with the arrival of a “new wave” of American giants of the 
digital economy – Netflix, Airbnb, Tesla and Uber (“NATU”) – and by the rise of 
the three largest Chinese technology companies – Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. 
[70] This phenomenon is leading to new mechanisms for value creation based 
on knowledge and intangible assets; to the increasing dominance of networks of 
stakeholders over individual players; and to the emergence of new forms of sharing, 
creation, collaboration and consumption – especially in the realm of information. 
“The challenges are not just commercial, but touch the very heart of the future of 
Europe as a political unit mastering its own destiny [71]”.
The EU is currently working to develop a technological ecosystem that will facil-
itate innovation; it wants to assert its “tech sovereignty” and maintain regulatory 
sovereignty in key areas. The bloc is cooperating at international level to harmonise 
rules, standards and policies within a multilateral framework (UN, UNESCO, 
OECD, G7, G20, CoE). A number of sensitive regulatory issues have emerged 
recently, all with the potential to influence democracy, including the market size of 
social media, how to tax intangible assets, personal data management and the ques-
tion of “ethical algorithms. [72]” The EU’s approach reflects its strategic objective to 
move from a “digital economy” to a “data economy” – its ultimate aim is to develop a 
single market for data within the European Single Market. [73]
4.2 A fair digital information ecosystem for the EU?
In the digital transformation of Europe, the question of disinformation 
(including misleading or outright false information) and its impact on democ-
racy has become a priority for the EU since 2015. [74] The rise of populism and 
extremism in some countries (Austria, France, Hungary, Italy, the Czech Republic 
and Poland) and the campaigns for Brexit in 2016 and for the European elections 
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in 2019 – both of which were marred by foreign interference – have led to a 
growing awareness within the EU and internationally of the harmful effects on 
public debate, political decision-making and democracy of manipulative commu-
nication via content distribution networks, social media services, video-sharing 
platforms and search engines. Disinformation campaigns led by third countries, 
cyberattacks and interference in the electoral processall represent threats for the 
EU’s internal security. [75] There are also privacy-related issues regarding the 
massive volumes of personal data collected by these platforms and the fact that it 
is becoming increasingly difficult to prevent third parties from storing and using 
them. [76]
Even if powers in the area of information lie with individual Member States, it 
is clear that the transnational and cross-border dimension of online disinformation 
makes a coordinated European approach necessary to ensure the protection of the 
EU’s citizens, policies and institutions. In 2015, on the initiative of the European 
Council, the EU institutions and the European External Action Service set up the 
East StratCom Task Force “to address Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns. 
[77]” The 2017 Joint Declaration on “Fake News,” Disinformation and Propaganda 
provides a focused treatment of the application of international human rights 
standards to the phenomenon of disinformation. [78] It sets out general principles 
and standards and defines roles and responsibilities for states, digital intermediaries 
and media outlets. The document emphasises states’ “positive obligation” to create 
an “enabling environment for freedom of expression” and identifies broad strands 
of public policy to this end. [79]
In June 2017, the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging the European 
Commission to carry out an in-depth review of the legislative and regulatory 
framework to limit the dissemination and spread of fake content. [80] In 2018, the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre carried out a study on fake news and 
disinformation which revealed that two thirds of consumers of online news prefer 
to access it through algorithm-driven platforms (search engines, news aggregators, 
social media websites) and also that market power and revenue streams have shifted 
from news publishers to platform operators who have the data to match readers, 
articles and advertisements. [81]
In March 2018, the European Council addressed the question of social networks 
and digital platforms, reiterating the need [“to guarantee transparent practices 
and full protection of citizens’ privacy and personal data. [82]”] The European 
Commission launched a comprehensive online consultation with citizens and 
stakeholders in 2017–2018 [83] and set up a High-Level Expert Group to advise on 
this matter. [84] Also worth noting are the adoption of the Directive on security of 
network and information systems (the NIS Directive), the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and the Regulation on Cross-Border Delivery Services. [85] 
The entry into force of the GDPR (2018) resulted in more stringent obligations 
for those using personal data and stronger rights for individuals, both within and 
outside the EU.
In its judgement of 13 May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) ruled on a first case of the “right to be forgotten” online. [86] The Court 
concluded that Google was responsible for the processing of personal data that 
appeared on its pages. In September 2019, two other judgements handed down by 
the CJEU on “de-referencing” consolidated the basis of the “right to be forgotten”. 
[87] The first judgement restricted the territorial scope of the right to de-refer-
encing, which is limited to the EU’s borders and is not binding for other countries. 
[88] The second judgement was related to the terms of application of search 
engines. Under this ruling, the personal data set out in the General Data Protection 
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Regulation (genetic and biometric data, data on sexual orientation, criminal offence 
data, etc.) are protected. But a balance needs to be found between the right to access 
information freely and the fundamental rights of those who request de-referencing. 
In the European Democracy Plan, which aims to empower citizens and build more 
resilient democracies across the EU (2020), the Commission sets out measures [“to 
promote free and fair elections, strengthen media freedom and counter disinforma-
tion. [89]”] The plan proposes measures to increase protection for journalists and 
tackle disinformation and interference, while fully preserving freedom of speech. In 
2020, the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), managed by a consortium 
led by the European University Institute in Florence (EUI), was also set up with the 
aim of “creating and supporting the work of an independent multidisciplinary com-
munity capable of contributing to a deeper understanding of the disinformation 
phenomenon and [increasing] societal resilience to it [90]”.
The debate over the lack of sufficient safeguards, oversight measures and 
enforcement to adequately deal with information, which is eliciting a response 
from civil society, politicians, regulators and, more recently, stakeholders of the 
global digital economy, has given rise to a self-regulatory Code of Practice on 
Disinformation drafted in 2018 by representatives of online platforms, leading 
social networks, advertisers and the advertising industry to address the spread 
of online disinformation and fake news and to protect users from disinforma-
tion. [91] The code, which came into force in September 2019, sets out a number 
of commitments for a more transparent, trustworthy and accountable online 
ecosystem and includes a list of best practices that the signatories pledge to adopt 
to implement these commitments. Initial signatories include major online plat-
forms (Facebook, Google, YouTube and Twitter), software providers (Mozilla), 
advertisers as well as a number of trade associations representing online platforms 
and the advertising industry. Microsoft and TikTok have now also signed the 
code (in May 2019 and June 2020 respectively), and like other companies have 
devised individual roadmaps with specific measures, methods and tools to combat 
disinformation that they intend to implement in all EU Member States. [92] The 
Commission will work in conjunction with the European Regulators Group for 
Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) to monitor the effectiveness of these  
commitments (Figure 1) [93].
Figure 1. 
Overview of EU joint and coordinated action against disinformation (2015–2019). Available from: https://
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinformation. Source: © European Union, 1995-2021.
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At the same time, the Commission is working to raise awareness of the inten-
tions, objectives, sources and tools of disinformation and to highlight our own 
vulnerability in this area. [“It is essential to understand how and why citizens, and 
sometimes entire communities, are drawn to disinformation narratives and define 
a comprehensive answer to this phenomenon. [94]”] In this regard, an indepen-
dent European network of fact-checkers is working to develop common methods, 
exchange best practices and achieve the broadest possible coverage of factual cor-
rections EU-wide, in accordance with a strict International Fact Checking Network 
Code of Principles. [95] A secure European online platform on disinformation will 
take shape to support the network of fact-checkers and relevant academic research-
ers with cross-border data collection and analysis, as well as access to data across the 
Member States. [96]
A number of stakeholders, including the Media Pluralism Monitor (run by the 
Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom in Florence), EDMO and the aca-
demic community, are working in synergy to develop a sound scientific methodol-
ogy which could help identify key EU-wide vulnerabilities. [97] A further step is to 
empower EU citizens to better identify and deal with disinformation and undesired 
content (as hate speech, child pornography, elements of pro-terrorism guidance or 
proselytism) through online media education and digital literacy. [98]
5. Charting an uncertain future
Information technology and the use of algorithms, big data and AI – all of 
which have already proved their worth in terms of economic growth, employment, 
innovation and improving quality of life – are set to play an increasing part in the 
development and workings of society and individuals.
While the positive potential of these factors has not yet been fully identified 
and harnessed, it is important to consider their impact on democracy, human rights 
(which overlap with wider ethical concerns) and the rule of law [99], as well as their 
influence on individual behaviour and thought. [100] How can we know, for example, 
whether a person’s vote – the ultimate expression of democracy – reflects a deep 
individual conviction or merely the influence of algorithms, or even manipulative 
fake news? If big data produces knowledge that is devoid of concepts and is not based 
on any preliminary hypothesis, will it merely result in “expertise without experts”? 
If so, who will take responsibility for it? Won’t this deprive citizens of the right to 
debate and decide? How can we safeguard the integrity of democratic principles? 
Recommendations by computers may have an air of rationality or infallibility, and 
people might blindly follow them. [“The human being may often be led to ‘rubber 
stamp’ an algorithmically prepared decision, not having the time, context or skills to 
make an adequate decision in the individual case. [101]”] Although they are portrayed 
as [“neutral tools of economic progress and social advancement, digital technologies 
have acquired an aura of ungovernability. […] In a rapidly unfolding datafied world, 
the integration of digital intelligence needs to be rooted in frameworks of account-
ability, where social intent guides the appropriation of technology [102]”].
In recent years, this issue has been high on the agenda of many European 
[103] and international multilateral stakeholders [104] which are reflecting on 
the need for common understanding of concepts and principles, and appropriate 
transnational regulation in the area of AI, with the participation of all segments 
of society – governments, public and private key actors, experts, practitioners and 
citizens. [105] States need to adopt interdisciplinary strategies to address the risks 
to democracy and human rights – and workers rights - posed by machine learning. 
[106] They should specifically legislate against forms of “illegitimate interference”, 
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including forms of persuasion and intrusion that compromise democratic prin-
ciples, and they should encourage public debate on the subject. [“[…]Governments 
should keep an eye of emerging disruptive technologies such as deep learning and 
generative adversarial networks (GANs), which make it possible to manipulate 
images and video so well that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish 
manipulated them from authentic ones. Apps like FakeApp and Lyrebird have 
made the production of “deep fakes” accessible to anyone. [107]”] AI needs to be 
grounded in human rights principles, and states need to update and enforce data 
protection regulations with respect to machine learning technologies and to pro-
mote policies that create a diverse and pluralistic information environment, includ-
ing the regulation of technology monopolies in the domain of AI. [108]
It is clear that in the years to come, journalism will be permeated by AI – com-
putational journalism and computer-assisted reporting; i-teams for algorithms and 
data; natural language generation for reading levels; computational photography; 
and journalism as a service [109] – and [“the advent of deep fakes and generative 
adversarial networks may accelerate this trend.”] This will give rise to new cross-
disciplinary challenges – technological, editorial, philosophical and ethical –, which 
will only be resolved by a combination of research, politics, cybersecurity, moral 
standards and education.
This new ecosystem raises various long-term issues. First, it may impose a domi-
nant culture, or even a single way of thinking (English is already virtually ubiq-
uitous as the language of communication in this environment, and certain world 
views are particularly dominant). On the other hand, paradoxically, in this unfet-
tered digital environment, the notion of borders and boundaries may suddenly rear 
its head in the form of standards and accessibility. In this context, digital education 
and media literacy are essential. The main responsibility lies with academia, since 
the key is not just the acquisition of digital know-how, but more importantly the 
development of a critical approach (not only to identity “fake news” but also to 
appraise “real” news stories) and a genuine ability for analytical thought, and a 
willingness to apply these skills. [“Critical thinking and discerning consumption 
of meaningful content, in a technoscape full of falsehoods remains an important 
challenge and policies that advocate critical media and digital literacy in schools and 
institutions in this context will be a positive move [110]”].
6. Conclusion
The multidimensional paradigm that is emerging in today’s competitive geo-
political environment is driven by a number of factors, including the primacy of 
intangible assets in value creation; the growing transnational and international 
dimension of production, consumption and innovation; the prevalence of networks 
of stakeholders over individual players; the transition from human labour to AI; 
and the need to harmonise rules, standards and policies within a multilateral 
framework. [111] The development of big data, data mining, algorithmic analysis 
and predictive profiling raises unique challenges for the rule of law, human rights, 
sovereignty and democracy.
These structural shifts will have a long-term impact on social and cultural 
practices, interpersonal and societal relations, the public space, citizenship and 
the exercise of democracy. In our digital world, there is a gap between the protec-
tion of freedom of expression and opinion and the reality of a globalised public 
space where, in the absence of appropriate regulations, anyone can interfere, often 
anonymously. Powers that were once the preserve of the state are now delegated to 
private structures or state entities in other countries.
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In Europe, traditional media is subject to wide-ranging rules on impartiality, 
pluralism, cultural diversity and harmful content. Democracy in the EU depends 
on the existence of free and independent media. The emergence of a virtual media 
environment, with its arsenal of “fake news”, “alternative facts” and disinforma-
tion, is generating new risks and uncertainty for society, especially since it is deeply 
intertwined with the broader digital ecosystem, in which technologies and tactics 
will continue to evolve. The exposure of citizens to large-scale disinformation 
represents a major challenge.
Tackling this phenomenon will require a coordinated effort on the part of 
governments, institutions, traditional media outlets and social media platforms, 
users, civil society and the academic community. The EU aim to take the lead in 
raising public awareness about disinformation. Its long-term action in this area is 
based on several strands: 1) cooperation between platforms and public authorities, 
including mobilising and coordinating fact-checkers; 2) an incremental approach 
to regulation, combining self-regulation (including “citizen regulation”) and 
co-regulation, in a way that supports diversity and pluralism (increased exposure 
to non-mainstream content) and promotes transparency (e.g. with “cyber nudges”) 
and shared practices; 3) a proactive media policy that encourages responsible 
behaviour in conveying information to end users and a more sustainable evolution 
of the online news market; and 4) a long-term strategy for digital education, media 
literacy and broad user empowerment.
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